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Abstract—Bayesian filtering deals with computing the posterior
distribution of the state of a stochastic dynamic system given
noisy observations. In this paper, motivated by applications in
counter-adversarial systems, we consider the following inverse
filtering problem: Given a sequence of posterior distributions
from a Bayesian filter, what can be inferred about the transition
kernel of the state, the observation likelihoods of the sensor
and the measured observations? For finite-state Markov chains
observed in noise (hidden Markov models), we show that a
least-squares fit for estimating the parameters and observations
amounts to a combinatorial optimization problem with non-
convex objective. Instead, by exploiting the algebraic structure of
the corresponding Bayesian filter, we propose an algorithm based
on convex optimization for reconstructing the transition kernel,
the observation likelihoods and the observations. We discuss and
derive conditions for identifiability. As an application of our
results, we illustrate the design of counter-adversarial systems:
By observing the actions of an autonomous enemy, we estimate
the accuracy of its sensors and the observations it has received.
The proposed algorithms are evaluated in numerical examples.
Index Terms—inverse filtering, hidden Markov models,
counter-adversarial autonomous systems, remote calibration, ad-
versarial signal processing
I. INTRODUCTION
IN a partially observed stochastic dynamic system, the stateis hidden in the sense that it can only be observed in
noise via a sensor. Formally, with p denoting a probability
density (or mass) function, such a system is represented by
the conditional densities:
xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0, (1)
yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk), (2)
where by ∼ we mean “distributed according to” and k denotes
discrete time. In (1), the state xk evolves according to a
Markovian transition kernel P on state-space X , and pi0 is its
initial distribution. In (2), an observation yk (in observation-
space Y) of the state is measured at each time instant according
to observation likelihoods B. An important example of (1)-(2),
where (1) is a finite-state Markov chain, is the so called hidden
Markov model (HMM) [1], [2].
In the Bayesian (stochastic) filtering problem [3], one seeks
to compute the conditional expectation of the state given
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noisy observations by evaluating a recursive expression for
the posterior distribution of the state:
pik(x) = p(xk = x|y1, . . . , yk), x ∈ X . (3)
The recursion for the posterior is given by the Bayesian filter
pik = T (pik−1, yk;P,B), (4)
where
{T (pi, y;P,B)}(x) = Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,xpi(ζ)dζ∫
X Bx,y
∫
X Pζ,xpi(ζ)dζdx
, x ∈ X ,
(5)
– see, e.g., [1], [2] for derivations and details. Two well known
finite dimensional cases of (5) are the Kalman filter, where
the dynamical system (1)-(2) is a linear Gaussian state-space
model, and the HMM filter, where the state is a finite-state
Markov chain.
In this paper, we treat and provide solutions to the following
inverse filtering problem:
Given a sequence of posteriors pi1, . . . , piN from the
filter (4), reconstruct (estimate) the filter’s parame-
ters: the system’s transition kernel P , the sensor’s
observation likelihoods B and the measured obser-
vations y1, . . . , yN .
An important motivating application is the design of
counter-adversarial systems [4]–[6]: Given measurements of
the actions of a sophisticated autonomous adversary, how to
remotely calibrate (i.e., estimate) its sensors and predict, so
as to guard against, its future actions? We refer the reader to
Fig. 1 on the next page for a schematic overview.
This paper extends our recent work [5]–[7] in two important
ways: First, [5]–[7] assumed that both the enemy and us know
the transition kernel P . In reality, if we generate the signal
xk, then the enemy estimates P (e.g., maximum likelihood
estimate) and we have to estimate the enemy’s estimate of P .
The first part of this paper constructs algorithms for doing
this based on observing (intercepting) posterior distributions.
In the second part, we consider the generalized setting where
the enemy’s posteriors are observed in noise via some policy.
Second, [5]–[7] did not deal with identifiability issues in in-
verse filtering. The current paper gives necessary and sufficient
conditions for identifiability of P and B given a sequence of
posteriors.
In addition, the filter (5) is a crucial component of many
engineering systems; success stories include, for example,
early applications in aerospace [8] and, more recently, the
global positioning system (GPS; [9]). It can be difficult, or
even impossible, to access raw sensor data in integrated smart
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Schematic Overview of a Counter-Adversarial Autonomous System
Fig. 1: An autonomous adversary measures our state xk as yk via a sensor B. A stochastic filter T is used to compute its
posterior pik of our state. Based on this posterior and a policy, a public action is taken. A counter-adversarial autonomous
system aims to devise a system and associated algorithms that can infer information private to the adversary. This information
forms a basis for predicting and taking suitable measures against future actions. In this paper, we consider the remote sensor
calibration problem (Problem 3), where the goal is to estimate the adversary’s sensor B based on observed actions.
sensors since they are often tightly encapsulated. The ability to
reverse engineer the parameters of a filtering system from only
its output suggests novel ways of performing fault detection
and diagnosis (see, e.g., [10], [11] for motivating examples) –
the most obvious being to compare reconstructed parameters to
their nominal values, or perform change-detection on multiple
data batches. Moreover, in cyber-physical security [12], the
algorithms proposed in this paper could be used to detect
malicious attacks by an intruder of a control system.
A. Main Results and Outline
To construct a tractable analysis, we consider the case where
(1)-(2) constitute a hidden Markov model (HMM) on a finite
observation-alphabet. The main results of this paper are:
• We analyze the uniqueness of the updates of the stochas-
tic filter (5) for HMMs (Theorems 1 and 2), and derive
an alternative characterization (Theorem 3) that highlights
important structural properties.
• We introduce the nullspace clustering problem (Prob-
lem 2) – which is complementary to the subspace cluster-
ing problem [13] – and propose an algorithm based on the
group LASSO [14] to solve it. In Theorem 4, we detail a
procedure to uniquely factorize unnormalized nullspaces
into HMM parameters.
• By leveraging the previous two points we demonstrate
how the transition kernel as well as the observation like-
lihoods of an HMM can be reconstructed from a sequence
of posteriors (Algorithm 1); then, the corresponding
sequence of observations can trivially be reconstructed
(Remark 5).
• We apply our results to the remote sensor calibration
problem (Problem 3) for counter-adversarial autonomous
systems. Even in a mismatched setting (i.e., where the
adversary employs uncertain estimates Pˆ and Bˆ in the
filter updates), we can estimate the adversary’s sensor,
and that too regardless of the quality of its estimates.
• Finally, the performance of our proposed inverse filtering
algorithms is demonstrated in numerical examples, where
we find that a surprisingly small amount of posteriors is
sufficient to reconstruct the sought parameters.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II formulates
the problems we consider, discusses identifiability, and shows
that a direct approach is computationally infeasible for large
data sizes. Our proposed inverse filtering algorithms are given
in Section III. In Section IV, we consider the design of
counter-adversarial autonomous systems and show how an
adversary’s sensors can be estimated from its actions. The
proposed algorithms are evaluated in Section V in numerical
examples. Detailed proofs and algebraic manipulations are
available in the supplementary material.
B. Related Work
Kalman’s inverse optimal control paper [15] from 1964,
aiming to determine for what cost criteria a given control
policy is optimal, is an early example of an inverse problem
in signal processing and automatic control. More recently, an
interest for similar problems has been sparked in the machine
learning community with the success of topics such as inverse
reinforcement learning, imitation learning and apprenticeship
learning [16]–[20] in which an agent learns by observing an
expert performing a task.
Variations of inverse filtering problems can be found in the
microeconomics literature (social learning; [21]) and the fault
detection literature (e.g., [22]–[25]), where the stochastic filter
is a standard tool. For example, the works [10], [11] were
motivated by fault detection in mobile robots and aimed to re-
construct sensor data from from state estimates by constructing
an extended observer.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the specific inverse
filtering problem we consider – reconstructing system and sen-
sor parameters directly from posteriors – was first introduced
in [7] for HMMs, and later discussed for linear Gaussian state-
space models in [26]. In both these papers, strong simplifying
assumptions were made. In contrast to the present work, it
was assumed that i) the transition kernel P of the system was
known, and that ii) the system and the filter were matched
in the sense that the update T (pik−1, yk;P,B) was used and
not the more realistic mismatched T (pik−1, yk; Pˆ, Bˆ), where
Pˆ and Bˆ denote estimates. The algorithms we propose in this
paper extend [7] to not require knowledge of the transition
dynamics, and are agnostic to whether the filter is mismatched
or not.
The latter is of crucial importance when applying inverse
filtering algorithms in counter-adversarial scenarios [4]–[6]. In
3such, an adversary is trying to estimate our state (via Bayesian
filtering) and does not, in general, have access to our transition
kernel – recall the setup from Fig. 1. Hence, its filtering
system is mismatched (e.g., a maximum likelihood estimate
Pˆ computed by the adversary is used instead of the true P ).
Compared to [5], [6] that aim to estimate information private
to the adversary, the present work does not assume knowledge
of the adversary’s filter parameters, nor that its filtering system
is matched.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first detail our notation and provide
necessary background material on hidden Markov models and
their corresponding stochastic filter. We then formally state
the problem we consider, and discuss the uniqueness of its
solution. Finally, we outline a “direct” approach to the problem
and point to potential computational concerns.
A. Notation
All vectors are column vectors unless transposed. The vector
of all ones is denoted 1 and the ith Cartesian basis vector ei.
The element at row i and column j of a matrix is [·]ij , and the
element at position i of a vector is [·]i. The vector operator
diag(·) : Rn → Rn×n gives the matrix where the vector has
been put on the diagonal, and all other elements are zero. The
indicator function I{·} takes the value 1 if the expression · is
fulfilled and 0 otherwise. The unit simplex is denoted as ∆.
The nullspace of a matrix is ker , and † denotes pseudo-inverse.
B. Hidden Markov Models
We refer to a partially observed dynamical model (1)-(2)
whose state space X = {1, . . . , X} is discrete as a hidden
Markov model (HMM). We limit ourselves to HMMs with
observation processes on a finite alphabet Y = {1, . . . , Y }.
For such HMMs, the state xk evolves according to the X×
X transition probability matrix P with elements
[P ]ij = Pr[xk+1 = j|xk = i], i, j ∈ X . (6)
The corresponding observation yk is generated according to
the X × Y observation probability matrix B with elements
[B]ij = Pr[yk = j|xk = i], i ∈ X , j ∈ Y. (7)
We denote column y of the observation matrix as by ∈ RX –
therefore
B =
[
b1 . . . bY
]
. (8)
Note that both P and B are row-stochastic matrices; their
elements are non-negative and the elements in each row sum
to one.
Under this model structure, it can be shown – see [1] or
[2] for complete treatments – that the Bayesian filter (5) for
updating the posterior takes the form
pik = T (pik−1, yk;P,B) =
diag(byk)P
Tpik−1
1T diag(byk)P
Tpik−1
, (9)
initialized by pi0,1 which we refer to as the HMM filter. Here,
the posterior pik ∈ RX has elements
[pik]i = Pr[xk = i|y1, . . . , yk], (10)
for i = 1, . . . , X . Note that pik ∈ {pi ∈ RX : pi ≥ 0,1Tpi =
1} def.= ∆ ⊂ RX . That is, the posterior pik lies on the (X − 1)-
dimensional unit simplex.
C. Inverse Filtering for HMMs
Although the problems we consider in this paper can be
generalized to partially observed models (1)-(2) on general
state and observation spaces, to obtain tractable algorithms
and analytical expressions, we limit ourselves to only discrete
HMMs as introduced in the previous section:
Problem 1 (Inverse Filtering for HMMs). Given a sequence of
posteriors pi0, pi1, . . . , piN ∈ RX from an HMM filter (9) with
known state and observation dimensions X and Y , reconstruct
the following quantities: i) the transition matrix P ; ii) the
observation matrix B; iii) the observations y1, . . . , yN .
To ensure that the problem is well posed, and to simplify
our analysis, we make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Ergodicity). The transition matrix P and the
observation matrix B are elementwise (strictly) positive.
Assumption 2 (Identifiability). The transition matrix P and
the observation matrix B are full column rank.
Assumption 1 serves as a proxy for ergodicity of the
HMM and the HMM filter – it is a common assumption
in statistical inference for HMMs [2], [27]. Assumption 2 is
related to identifiability and assures that no state or observation
distribution is a convex combination of that of another.
Remark 1. Neither of these two assumptions is strict; we vio-
late Assumption 1 in the numerical experiments in Section V,
and Assumption 2 could be relaxed according [7, Sec. 2.4].
However, they simplify our analysis and the presentation.
D. Identifiability in Inverse Filtering
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following identi-
fiability result:
Theorem 1. Suppose that two HMMs P , B and P˜ , B˜ both
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then the HMM filter is uniquely
identifiable in terms of the transition and observation matrices.
That is, for each observation y = 1, . . . , Y ,
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y; P˜, B˜), ∀pi ∈ ∆, (11)
if and only if P = P˜ and B = B˜.
Theorem 1 guarantees that the HMM filter update (9) is
unique in the sense that two HMMs with different transition
and/or observation matrices cannot generate exactly the same
posterior updates. In turn, this leads us to expect that Prob-
lem 1 is well-posed; we should be able to reconstruct both P
and B uniquely once the conditions of Theorem 1 are fulfilled.
1For notational simplicity, we assume that the initial prior for the filter is
the same as the initial distribution of the HMM.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the set ∆y in Theorem 2 (for X = 3).
The blue crosses correspond to piy1 , . . . , pi
y
X and the red triangle
to piyX+1. For the conditions of the theorem to be fulfilled, the
point piyX+1 cannot lie on the dashed lines.
Note, however, that Theorem 1 does not assert that the
HMM filter is identifiable from a sample path of posteriors
– the sample path could be finite and/or only visit a subset of
the probability simplex. In particular, in applying Theorem 1
for Problem 1, we would need to guarantee that updates from
every point on the simplex have been observed – this seems
unnecessarily strong.
The following theorem is a generalization of Theorem 1 and
is the main identifiability result of this paper.
Theorem 2. Suppose that two HMMs P , B and P˜ , B˜ both
satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Let, for each y = 1, . . . , Y , ∆y =
{piy1 , . . . , piyX , piyX+1} ⊂ ∆ be a set of X + 1 posteriors such
that piy1 , . . . , pi
y
X ∈ RX are linearly independent and the last
posterior piyX+1 ∈ RX can be written
piyX+1 = [β]1pi
y
1 + · · ·+ [β]XpiyX , (12)
with β ∈ RX and [β]i 6= 0 for each i. Then, for each y =
1, . . . , Y ,
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y; P˜, B˜), ∀pi ∈ ∆y, (13)
if and only if P = P˜ and B = B˜.
Theorem 2 relaxes Theorem 1 in the sense that, for each
observation y = 1, . . . , Y , we only need a sequence of X + 1
posteriors satisfying the conditions for the set ∆y . To make
the theorem more concrete, for X = 3, the conditions mean
that all posteriors we have obtained cannot lie on the lines
connecting any two posteriors – see Fig. 2 for an illustration.
E. Direct Approach to the Inverse Filtering Problem
At a first glance, Problem 1 appears computationally in-
tractable: there are combinatorial elements (due to the un-
known sequence of observations) and non-convexity from the
products between columns by of the observation matrix and
the transition matrix P in the HMM filter (9).
In order to reconstruct parameters that are consistent with
the data (i.e., that satisfy the filter equation (9) and fulfill
the non-negativity and sum-to-one constraints imposed by
probabilities), a direct approach is to solve the following
feasibility problem:
min
{yk}Nk=1, {by}Yy=1, P
N∑
k=1
∥∥∥∥pik − diag(byk)PTpik−11T diag(byk)PTpik−1
∥∥∥∥
s.t. yk ∈ {1, . . . , Y }, for k = 1, . . . , N,
by ≥ 0, for y = 1, . . . , Y,
[b1 . . . bY ]1 = 1,
P1 = 1, P ≥ 0, (14)
where the choice of norm is arbitrary since the cost is zero
for any feasible set of parameters.
The problem (14) is combinatorial (in {yk}Nk=1}) and non-
convex (in {by}Yy=1 and P ) – in other words, it is challenging
and computationally costly to obtain a solution. In the next
section, we will propose an indirect approach that results in a
computationally feasible solution to Problem 1.
III. INVERSE FILTERING BY EXPLOITING
THE STRUCTURE OF THE HMM FILTER
In this section, we first derive an alternative characterization
of the HMM filter (9). The properties of this characterization
allow us to formulate an alternative solution to Problem 1.
This solution still requires solving a combinatorial problem
(a nullspace clustering problem, see Problem 2 below) and is,
essentially, equivalent to (14). However, by leveraging insights
from its geometrical interpretation, we derive a computation-
ally feasible convex relaxation based on structured sparsity
regularization (the fused group LASSO [14]) that permits us
to obtain a solution in a computationally feasible manner.
A. Alternative Characterization of the HMM Filter
Our first result is a variation of the key result derived in [7].
First note that the HMM filter (9) can be rewritten as
(9) ⇐⇒ bTykPTpik−1pik = diag(byk)PTpik−1, (15)
by simply multiplying by the denominator (which is allowed
under Assumption 1). By restructuring2 (15), we obtain an
alternative characterization of the HMM filter (9):
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the HMM filter-
update (9) can be equivalently written as
(piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) vec(diag(byk)PT ) = 0, (16)
for k = 1, . . . , N .
To see why the reformulation (16) is useful, recall that in
Problem 1, we aim to estimate the transition matrix P , the
observation matrix B and the observations yk given posteriors
pik. Hence, the coefficient matrix (piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) on the
left-hand side of (16) is known to us, and all that we aim to
estimate is contained in its nullspace.
2Detailed algebraic manipulations can be found in the appendix.
5B. Reconstructing P and B from Nullspaces
It is apparent from (16) that everything we seek to estimate
(i.e., the transition matrix P , the observation matrix B and
the observations) is accommodated in a vector that lies in the
nullspace of a known coefficient matrix. Even so, it is not
obvious that the sought quantities can be reconstructed from
this. In particular, since a nullspace is only determined up to
scalings of its basis vectors, by leveraging (16) we can at most
hope to reconstruct the directions of vectors vec(diag(by)PT ):
αy vec(diag(by)P
T ) ∈ RX2 , (17)
for y = 1, . . . , Y , where αy ∈ R>0 correspond to scale factors.
Can a set of vectors (17) be factorized into P and B, and
do the undetermined scale factors αy (which, again, are due to
the nullspace basis only being determined up to scaling) pose
a problem? Our next theorem shows that it can be done. First,
however, note that by reshaping (17), we equivalently have
access to matrices ay diag(by)PT ∈ RX×X for y = 1, . . . , Y .
Theorem 4. Given are matrices Vy
def.
= αy diag(by)P
T for
y = 1, . . . , Y , where P and B =
[
b1 . . . bY
]
are HMM
parameters satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, and αy are strictly
positive (unknown) scalars. Let L
def.
=
∑Y
y=1 V
T
y , then the
transition matrix P can be reconstructed as
P = Ldiag(L−11). (18)
Subsequently, let B¯
def.
=
[
V1P
−T1 . . . VY P−T1
]
, then the
observation matrix can be reconstructed as
B = B¯ diag(B¯†1). (19)
The proof of Theorem 4 amounts to algebraically verifying
that the relations (18) and (19) hold by employing properties
of row-stochastic matrices. The last factor in each equation
can be interpreted as a sum-to-one normalization.
C. How to Compute the Nullspaces?
Theorem 4 gives us a procedure to reconstruct the transition
and observation matrices from vectors (17) – i.e., vectors
parallel to vec(diag(by)PT ) for y = 1, . . . , Y . The goal in
the remaining part of this section is to compute such vectors
from the known coefficient matrices in (16).
If the nullspace of the coefficient matrix of (16) was one-
dimensional, we could proceed as in [7]: Since there are only
a finite number of values, namely Y , that the yk:s can take,
there are only a finite number of directions in which the
nullspaces can point; along the vectors vec(diag(by)PT ) for
y = 1, . . . , Y . Hence, once a coefficient matrix corresponding
to each observation y has been obtained, these directions can
be reconstructed.
Unfortunately, the nullspace of the coefficient matrix of (16)
is not one-dimensional:
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have that
rank(piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) = X − 1. (20)
Since vec(diag(by)PT ) ∈ RX2 , the null-space is, in fact,
X2 − (X − 1) dimensional. Below, we demonstrate how,
by intersecting multiple nullspaces, we can obtain a one-
dimensional subspace (a vector) that is parallel to the vector
vec(diag(by)P
T ) that we seek.
Remark 2. The above is not surprising in the light of that every
update (9) of the posterior corresponds to X equations.3 In [7],
only the X parameters of diag(by) had to be reconstructed at
each time instant since P was assumed known. Now, instead,
we aim to reconstruct the X2 parameters of diag(by)PT ,
which cannot be done with just one update (i.e., with X
equations). Hence, we will need to employ the equations from
several updates.
D. Special Case: Known Sequence of Observations
To make the workings of our proposed method more
transparent, suppose for the moment that we have access to
the sequence of observations y1, . . . , yN that were processed
by the filter (9). By Theorem 3, we know that the vector
vec(diag(byk)P
T ) lies in the nullspace of the coefficient
matrix (piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) for all k = 1, . . . , N . If we
consider only the time instants when a certain observation,
say y, was processed, then the vector vec(diag(by)PT ) lies in
the nullspace of all the corresponding coefficient matrices:
vec(diag(by)P
T ) ∈
⋂
k: yk=y
ker (piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]), (21)
for y = 1, . . . , Y . Now, if the intersection on the right-
hand side of (21) is one-dimensional, this gives us a way to
reconstruct the direction of vec(diag(by)PT ) – in this case,
span(vec(diag(by)P
T )) =
⋂
k: yk=y
ker (piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]),
(22)
and we simply compute the one-dimensional intersection.
Recall that the next step would then be to factorize these
directions into the products P and B via Theorem 4.
The identifiability result of Theorem 2 tells us that this
happens when there exists a subsequence ∆y ⊂ {pik}k:yk=y ,
that satisfies the criteria in Theorem 2.
Remark 3. In practice, roughly X updates, for each y, should
be enough (see Remark 2). A pessimistic estimate of how
many samples will be required for this can be obtain via
similar reasoning as in [7, Lemma 3]: if B ≥ β > 0
elementwise, then on the order of β−1Y X2 samples are
expected to suffice.
E. Inverse Filtering via Nullspace Clustering
Problem 1 is complicated by the fact that in the inverse
filtering problem, we do not have access to the sequence of
observations – we only observe a sequence of posteriors. Thus,
we do not know at what time instants a certain observation y
3Actually, only X − 1 equations since the sum-to-one property of the
posterior makes one equation superfluous.
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Fig. 3: We are given a set of subspaces parametrized by the
nullspaces of matrices A1, . . . , AN . These subspaces have the
property that each subspace contains one of the Y vectors
v1, . . . , vY . In the nullspace clustering problem (Problem 2),
the aim is to find the (directions of) vectors v1, . . . , vY .
was processed and, hence, which nullspaces to intersect, as in
(22), to obtain a vector parallel to vec(diag(by)PT ).
An abstract version of the problem can be posed as follows:
Problem 2 (Nullspace Clustering). Given is a set of matrices
{Ak}Nk=1 that can be divided into Y subsets (clustered) such
that the intersection of the nullspaces of the matrices in each
subset is one-dimensional. That is, there are numbers {yk}Nk=1
with yk ∈ {1, . . . , Y } such that,⋂
k: yk=y
kerAk = span(vy), (23)
for some vector vy with y = 1, . . . , Y . Find the vectors
{vy}Yy=1 that span the intersections.
We provide a graphical illustration of the nullspace cluster-
ing problem in Fig. 3. Note that, in our instantiation of the
problem, Ak = (piTk−1⊗[pik1T−I]) is the coefficient matrix of
the HMM filter (16), and each vector vy = vec(diag(by)PT )
is what we aim to reconstruct.
The problem was simplified in the previous section, since by
knowing the observations y1, . . . , yN , we know which vector
each subspace is generated about (i.e., the subset assignments)
and can simply intersect the subspaces in each subset to obtain
the vectors v1, . . . , vY . By not having direct access to the
sequence of observations, the problem becomes combinatorial;
which nullspaces should be intersected? Albeit a solution can
be obtained via mixed-integer optimization in much the same
fashion as in (14) – since Problem 2 is merely a reformulation
of the original problem – such an approach can be highly
computationally demanding.
We propose instead the following two-step procedure that
consists of, first, a convex relaxation, and second, a refinement
step using local heuristics. We emphasize that if the two steps
succeed, then there is nothing approximate about the solution
we obtain – the directions of the vectors vy are obtained
exactly.
Step 1. Convex Relaxation: Compute a solution to the
convex problem
min
{wk}Nk=1
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
‖wi − wj‖∞
s.t. Akwk = 0, for k = 1, . . . , N,
wk ≥ 1, for k = 1, . . . , N, (24)
which aims to find N vectors that each lie in the nullspace
of the corresponding matrix Ak, and that, by the objective
function, are promoted to coincide via a fused group LASSO
[14]. That is, the set {wk}Nk=1 is sparse in the number of
unique vectors. This is a relaxation because we have dropped
the hard constraint of there only being exactly Y different
vectors. The constraint wk ≥ 1 assures that we avoid the
trivial case wk = 0 for all k.4 The ‖ · ‖∞-norm is used for
convenience since problem (24) can then be reformulated as
a linear program.
Step 2. Refinement via Spherical Clustering: The solution of
(24) does not completely solve our problem for two reasons: i)
it is not guaranteed to return precisely Y unique basis vectors,
and ii) it does not tell us to which subset the nullspace of
each Ak should be assigned (i.e., we still do not know which
nullspaces to intersect).
In order to address these two points, we perform a local
refinement using spherical k-means clustering [28] on the set
of vectors {wk}Nk=1 resulting from (24). This provides us with
a set of Y centroid vectors, as well as a cluster assignment
of each vector wk. We employ the spherical version of k-
means since we seek nullspace basis vectors – the appropriate
distance measure is angular spread, and not the Euclidean
norm employed in standard k-means clustering.
Now, the centroid vectors should provide good approxima-
tions of the vectors we seek (since {wk}Nk=1 are expected to
be spread around the intersections of the nullspaces by the
sparsity promoting objective in (24)). However, they do not
necessarily lie in any nullspace since their computation is un-
constrained. To obtain an exact solution to the problem, we go
through the wk:s assigned to each cluster in order of distance
to the cluster’s centroid and intersect the corresponding Ak:s’
nullspaces until we obtain a one-dimensional intersection.
It should be underlined that when an intersection that is one-
dimensional has been obtained, the (direction of) the vector vy
has been computed exactly. Recall that in our instantiation of
the problem, each vector vy = vec(diag(by)PT ), so that once
these have been reconstructed, they can be decomposed into
the transition matrix P and the observation matrix B according
to Theorem 4.
Remark 4. Theorem 4 assumes that we are given the matrices
Vy sorted according to the actual labeling of the HMM’s
observations. If we use the method described above, the
vectors are only obtained up to permutations of the observation
labels (this corresponds to the label assigned to each cluster in
the spherical k-means algorithm). Hence, in practice, we will
obtain B up to permutations of its columns.
4In order to relax Assumption 1, this can be replaced by 1Twk ≥ 1 since
some components of the nullspace might then be zero.
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Fig. 4: Schematic illustration of the setup in (25)-(28). An autonomous adversary measures our state xk as yk via a sensor B.
A mismatched (note that estimates Pˆ and Bˆ are employed) Bayesian filter is used to compute its posterior pik of our state.
Based on this posterior and a policy G, a public action uk is taken. In the remote sensor calibration problem (Problem 3), the
aim is to estimate the adversary’s sensor B (which is, in general, different from Bˆ).
F. Summary of Proposed Algorithm
For convenience, the complete procedure for solving Prob-
lem 1 is summarized in Algorithm 1. It should be pointed out
that the algorithm will fail to determine a solution to Problem 1
if it can not intersect down to a one-dimensional subspace for
some y. Then, the direction of the vector vec(diag(by)PT )
cannot be determined uniquely, and the full set of these vectors
is required in Theorem 4. This is because this observation has
not been measured enough times, or that the convex relaxation
has failed. As noted in Remark 2, we expect on the order of
Y X2 posteriors to be needed for the procedure to succeed –
we explore this further in the numerical examples in Section V.
Remark 5. Once P and B have been reconstructed via Algo-
rithm 1, to obtain the sequence of observations, simply check
which observation y ∈ Y that maps pik−1 to pik via the HMM
filter (9) for k = 1, . . . , N . This can be done in linear time
(in N ).
IV. APPLICATIONS OF INVERSE FILTERING TO
COUNTER-ADVERSARIAL AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
During the last decade, the importance of defense against
cyber-adversarial and autonomous treats has been highlighted
on numerous occasions – e.g., [4], [29], [30]. In this section,
we illustrate how the results in the previous section can
be generalized when i) the posteriors from the Bayesian
filter are observed in noise, and ii) the filtering system is
mismatched. The problem is motived by remotely calibrating
Algorithm 1 Inverse Filtering (Solution to Problem 1)
Require: Sequence of posteriors {pik}Nk=1, dimension Y
1: Compute the coefficient matrices Ak = (piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) of (16) for
k = 1, . . . , N .
2: Compute a solution {wk}Nk=1 to the convex problem (24).
3: Run spherical k-means clustering for Y clusters on the vectors {wk}Nk=1
4: for each of the Y clusters do
5: k-set = {}
6: for each wk in order of increasing distance to its cluster’s centroid do
7: Compute intersection of current, and past, corresponding Ak:s’ nullspaces:
i) Add k to k-set,
ii) Compute
⋂
k∈k-set kerAk
8: if intersection is one-dimensional then
9: Save as vy and proceed to the next cluster.
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: Factorize {vy}Yy=1 into P and B using equations (18) and (19), respectively.
14: To obtain the corresponding sequence of observations, see Remark 5.
(i.e., estimating) the sensors of an autonomous adversary by
observing its actions.
A. Counter-Adversarial Autonomous Systems
Consider an adversary that employs an autonomous filtering
and control system that estimates our state and takes actions
based on a control policy. The goal in the design of a counter-
adversarial autonomous (CAA) system is to infer information
private to the adversary, and to predict and guard against its
future actions [4]–[6].
Formally, it can be interpreted as a two-player game in
the form of a partially observed Markov decision process
(POMDP; [1]), where information is partitioned between two
players: us and the adversary. The model (1)-(2) is now
generalized to:
us: xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0 (25)
adversary: yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk), (26)
adversary: pik = T (pik−1, yk; Pˆ, Bˆ), (27)
adversary & us: uk ∼ Gpik,u = p(u|pik), (28)
which should be interpreted as follows. The state xk ∈ X ,
with initial condition pi0, is our state that we use to probe the
adversary. The observation yk ∈ Y is made by the adversary,
who subsequently computes its posterior (in this setting, we
refer to it also as a belief ) pik of our state using the Bayesian
filter T from (5).5 Note that the adversary does not have perfect
knowledge of our transition kernel P nor its sensor B; it uses
estimates Pˆ and Bˆ in (27). Finally, the adversary takes an
action uk ∈ U , where U is an action set, according to a control
policy G based on its belief.
A schematic overview is drawn in Fig. 4, where the dashed
boxes demarcate information between the players (public
means both us and the adversary have access).
B. Remote Calibration of an Adversary’s Sensors
Various questions can be asked that are of importance in the
design of a CAA system. The specific problem we consider
is that of remotely calibrating the adversary’s sensor:
5Again, for notational simplicity, we assume that the initial prior for the
filter is the same as the initial distribution of the state.
8Problem 3 (Remote Calibration of Sensors in CAA Systems).
Consider the CAA system (25)-(28). Given knowledge of our
realized state sequence x0, x1, x2, . . . , our transition kernel P
and the actions taken by the adversary u1, u2, . . . ; estimate
the observation likelihoods B of the adversary’s sensor.
A few remarks on the above problem: Our final targets
are the likelihoods B, not the adversary’s own estimate Bˆ.
Previous work [5]–[7] that considered the above problem,
or variations thereof, assumed that the adversary’s filter was
perfectly matched (i.e., Pˆ = P and Bˆ = B) and, hence,
that P was known to the adversary. We generalize to the
more challenging setup of a mismatched filtering system, and
will, hence, have to estimate the adversary’s estimate of our
transition kernel. Albeit outside the scope of this paper, with a
solution to Problem 3 in place, a natural extension is the input
design problem adapted to CAA systems: How to design our
transition kernel P so as to i) maximally confuse the adversary,
or ii) optimally estimate its sensor?
In order to connect with the results of the previous section,
we consider only discrete CAA systems – that is, where
the state space X = {1, . . . , X} and observation space
Y = {1, . . . , Y } are discrete. Moreover, we assume that the
dimensions X and Y are known to both us and the adversary.
C. Reconstructing Beliefs from Actions
The feasibility of Problem 3 clearly depends on the adver-
sary’s policy – for example, if the policy is independent of its
belief pik, we can hardly hope to estimate anything regarding
its sensors. A natural assumption is that the adversary is
rational and that its policy G is based on optimizing its
expected cost [31]–[33]:
min
uk
Exk {c(xk, uk) | y1, . . . , yk}
s.t. uk ∈ C, (29)
where c(x, u) is a cost function that depends on our state
and an action u ∈ C ⊂ U , with C a constraint set. That is,
the adversary selects an action by minimizing the cost it is
expected to receive in the next time instant.
Recall that the results in Section III reconstruct filter pa-
rameters from posteriors. In order to leverage these results for
Problem 3, we first need to obtain the adversary’s posterior
distributions from its actions. This is discussed to a longer
extent in [5], [6], in a Bayesian framework, and in [34] in
an analytic setting. We will use, and briefly recap, the main
results of [34] below.
However, first of all, even with a structural form such as
(29) in place, the set of potential policies is still infinite.
Without any prior assumptions on the adversary’s preferences
and constraints, it is impossible to conclusively infer specifics
regarding its posteriors. In [34], it is assumed that:
Assumption 3. We know the adversary’s cost function c(x, u)
and its constraint set C. Moreover, c(x, u) is convex and
differentiable in u.
Under this assumption, the full set of posteriors that the
adversary could have had at any time instant was characterized
in [34] using techniques from inverse optimization [35]. Some
regularity conditions are needed to guarantee that a unique
posterior can be reconstructed – in general, several posteriors
could result in the same action, which would complicate our
upcoming treatment of Problem 3. One set of such conditions
is the following:
Assumption 4. The adversary’s decision is unconstrained in
Euclidean space, i.e., C = U = RU for some dimension U .
The matrix
F (u) =
[∇uc(1, u) . . . ∇uc(X,u)
1 . . . 1
]
(30)
has full column rank when evaluated at the observed actions
u1, . . . , uN .
This assumption says, roughly, that the cost functions de-
fined in (29) are “different enough”, and that no information
is truncated via active constraints. The key result is then the
following:
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the posteriors of an
adversary selecting actions according to (29) can be uniquely
reconstructed by us from its actions as
pik = F (uk)
† [0 . . . 0 1]T , (31)
for k = 1, . . . , N , where the matrix F (u) is defined in (30)
and the last vector consists of X zeros and a single one.
The theorem follows directly from [34, Theorem 1] and the
linear independence of columns of the matrix F (u) in (30) –
details are available in the appendix.
D. Solution to the Remote Sensor Calibration Problem
We will now outline a solution to Problem 3 that leverages
the inverse filtering algorithms from Section III.
Step 1. Reconstruct Posteriors: Using Theorem 5, recon-
struct the adversary’s sequence of posteriors pi1, . . . , piN from
its observed actions and the structural form of its policy.
Step 2. Reconstruct Pˆ and Bˆ: Apply Algorithm 1 from Sec-
tion III on the sequence of posteriors. Note that the posteriors
were computed by the adversary using a mismatched filter (27)
– i.e., as T (pi, y; Pˆ, Bˆ) –, so that Algorithm 1 reconstructs the
adversary’s estimates Pˆ and Bˆ of our transition matrix P and
its sensor B.
Step 3. Reconstruct the Observations: As mentioned in
Remark 5, once the filter’s parameters are known it is trivial
to reconstruct the corresponding sequence of observations
y1, . . . , yN .
Step 4. Calibrate the Adversary’s Sensor: We now have
access to the observations y1, . . . , yN that were realized by
the HMM (P,B) and, by the setup of the CAA system
(25)-(28), the corresponding state sequence x1, . . . , xN . With
this information, we can compute our maximum likelihood
estimate Bˇ of the adversary’s sensor B via
[Bˇ]ij =
∑N
k=1 I{xk = i, yk = j}∑N
k=1 I{xk = i}
, (32)
which corresponds to the M-step in the expectation-
maximization (EM) algorithm for HMMs – see, e.g., [36,
Section 6.2.3]. This completes the solution to Problem 3.
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Fig. 5: In Problem 1, we obtain a sequence {pik}Nk=1 of
posteriors from an HMM filter (9). Out of 100 realizations,
for each value of N , we compute the fraction of times that
Algorithm 1 successfully reconstructs the transition matrix P
and the observation matrix B of the HMM (red diamonds). We
also plot the success rate of an oracle method (green circles)
that has access to the observations. With around N = 50
posteriors, the algorithm succeeds frequently.
Discussion: It is worth making a few remarks at this point.
First of all, it should be underlined that Bˆ 6= Bˇ – that
is, our estimate Bˇ is not necessarily equal to that of the
adversary Bˆ. In fact, our estimate depends on the number N
of observed actions and is, as such, improving over time by the
asymptotic consistency of the maximum likelihood estimate.
If the adversary does not recalibrate its estimate Bˆ online,
then for large enough N , our estimate will eventually be more
accurate than the adversary’s own estimate.
Moreover, the steps in Section IV-D are independent of the
accuracy of the adversary’s estimates Pˆ and Bˆ (as long as
they fulfill Assumptions 1 and 2) since we are exploiting the
algebraic structure of its filter. This means that, even if the
adversary employs a bad estimate of our transition matrix P ,
as long as it is taking actions, we can improve our estimate
of its sensor B.
Finally, if the setup is modified so that we do not have access
to the transition matrix P or the realized state sequence in (25),
then the step (32) would be replaced by the full EM algorithm.
This would compute our estimates Pˇ and Bˇ of the system’s
transition matrix P and the adversary’s sensor B based on the
reconstructed observations made by the adversary. Again, by
the asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimate,
the accuracy of these estimates (that depend on N ) will
eventually surpass those of the adversary.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate and illustrate the proposed
inverse filtering algorithms in numerical examples. All sim-
ulations were run in MATLAB R2018a on a 1.9 GHz CPU.
A. Reconstructing P and B via Inverse Filtering
Recall that Problem 1 aims to reconstruct HMM parameters
given a sequence of posterior distributions. Algorithm 1 is
deterministic, but there is randomness in terms of the data
(the realization of the HMM) which can cause the algorithm
[pi]1[pi]2
[pi]3
Evolution of the Posterior Distribution
Fig. 6: A realization of the set {pik}50k=1, corresponding to
HMM (34), illustrated on the simplex. The points are labeled
according to what observation was measured: y = 1 (red
triangle), y = 2 (blue cross), y = 3 (green circle). To fulfill
the conditions of Theorem 2, the points corresponding to each
observation cannot all lie on the lines connecting any two
points – see Fig. 2.
to fail to reconstruct the HMM’s parameters. This can happen
for three different reasons: First, if a certain observation has
been measured too few times then there is fundamentally too
few equations available to reconstruct the parameters – see
Remark 2 (in Section III-C). Second, if too few independent
equations have been generated, we do not have identifiability
and cannot intersect to a one-dimensional subspace in (22)
– see Theorem 2. Third, we rely on a convex relaxation to
solve the original combinatorial problem. This is a heuristic
and it is not guaranteed to converge to a solution of the
original problem. Hence, in these simulations, we estimate
the probability of the algorithm succeeding (with respect to
the realization of the HMM data).
In order to demonstrate that the assumptions we have made
in the paper are not strict, we consider the following HMM:
P =

0 1/2 0 0 1/2
1/2 0 1/2 0 0
0 1/2 0 1/2 0
0 0 1/2 0 1/2
1/2 0 0 1/2 0
 , B =

2/5 2/5 1/5
2/5 2/5 1/5
2/5 1/5 2/5
1/5 2/5 2/5
1/5 2/5 2/5
 .
(33)
Note that its transition matrix corresponds to a random walk,
which violates Assumption 1. We consider a reconstruction
successful if the error in norm is smaller than 10−3 for both P
and B. We generated 100 independent realizations for a range
of values of N (the number of posteriors). The fractions of
times the algorithms were successful are plotted in Fig. 5 with
red diamonds for Algorithm 1, and with green circles for an
oracle method that has access to the corresponding sequence
of observations. The oracle method provides an upper bound
on the success rate (if it fails, it is not possible to uniquely
reconstruct the HMM parameters, as discussed above). The
gap between the curves is due to the convex relaxation.
A few things should be noted from Fig. 5. First, with only
around 50 posteriors from the HMM filter, the fraction of times
the algorithm succeeds in solving Problem 1 is high. It was
noted in Remark 3 (in Section III-D), that since B ≥ 1/5 def.= β,
a rough estimate is that β−1Y X2 = 375 posteriors should
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Fig. 7: Same setup as in Fig. 5, but for the HMM (34).
With access to around 50 posteriors, Algorithm 1 succeeds
in reconstructing P and B very frequently.
suffice – however, as is clear from Fig. 5, this is a very
conservative estimate since the algorithm is very successful
already with around 50 posteriors. Second, the gap between the
two curves is small – hence, the convex relaxation is successful
in achieving a solution to the original combinatorial problem.
Finally, it should be mentioned that with 50 posteriors, the
run-time is approximately thirty seconds.
B. Evolution of the Posterior Distribution
Next, to illustrate the conditions of Theorem 2, we plot the
set {pik}50k=1 on the simplex. To be able to visualize the data,
we now consider an HMM with dimension X = 3:
P =
 0.8 0.1 0.10.05 0.9 0.05
0.2 0.1 0.7
 , B =
 0.7 0.1 0.20.1 0.8 0.1
0.05 0.05 0.9
 .
(34)
In Fig. 6, each posterior has been marked according to
which observation was subsequently measured. We can clearly
find four posteriors, for each observation, that are sufficiently
disperse (see the illustration in Fig. 2), and hence fulfill the
conditions for Theorem 2 that guarantees a unique solution.
The results of simulations with the same setup as before
are shown in Fig. 7, and similar conclusions can be drawn.
First, with around 50 posteriors, the algorithm has a high
success rate. Second, the bound in Remark 3 (in Section III-D)
postulate an expected number of posteriors of 540, which again
is conservative.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered inverse filtering problems for
hidden Markov models (HMMs) with finite observation spaces.
We proposed algorithms to reconstruct the transition kernel,
the observation likelihoods and the measured observations
from a sequence of posterior distributions computed by an
HMM filter. Our key algorithm is a two-step procedure based
on a convex relaxation and a subsequent local refinement. We
discussed and derived conditions for identifiability in inverse
filtering. As an application of our results, we demonstrated
how the proposed algorithms can be employed in the design
of counter-adversarial autonomous systems: How to remotely
calibrate the sensors of an autonomous adversary based on its
actions? Finally, the algorithms were evaluated and verified in
numerical simulations.
In the future, we would like to analyze the nullspace
clustering problem further and see if it applies to other settings.
We would also like to generalize the setup to other policy-
structures of the adversary – for example, when its action set
is discrete.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove Theorem 1, we will use the following auxiliary
lemma:
Lemma 2. Let A ∈ RX×X and M ∈ RX×X be two non-
singular matrices. If
Ax = κ(x)Mx, ∀x ∈ ∆, (35)
where κ(x) is a non-zero scalar, and ∆ = {x ∈ RX : x ≥
0,1Tx = 1} is the unit simplex, then
A = κM, (36)
where κ is a non-zero constant scalar.
Proof. Consider the ith Cartesian basis vector ei ∈ ∆:
Aei = κ(ei)Mei. (37)
Concatenate (37) for i = 1, . . . , X , to get
A
[
e1 . . . eX
]
= M
[
κ(e1)e1 . . . κ(eX)eX
]
=⇒
A = M
κ(e1) 0. . .
0 κ(eX)
 . (38)
Next, consider any vector on the simplex with non-zero
components:
x = [x]1e1 + · · ·+ [x]XeX ∈ ∆, (39)
such that [x]i 6= 0 for i = 1, . . . , X . Introducing (38) in (35)
for this x yields
M
κ(e1) 0. . .
0 κ(eX)
 ([x]1e1 + · · ·+ [x]XeX)
= κ(x)M ([x]1e1 + · · ·+ [x]XeX) =⇒
κ(e1)[x]1e1 + · · ·+ κ(eX)[x]XeX
= κ(x)[x]1e1 + · · ·+ κ(x)[x]1eX , (40)
where in the implication we have multiplied by M−1 from the
left and simplified the expression. Since the ei:s are linearly
independent, consider any component of (40):
κ(ei)[x]i = κ(x)[x]i =⇒
κ(ei) = κ(x), (41)
for i = 1, . . . , X , since [x]i 6= 0. In other words,
κ(e1) = · · · = κ(eX) = κ(x) def.= κ (42)
is constant. Introducing this in (38) yields
A = M
κ 0. . .
0 κ

= κM. (43)
To employ Lemma 2, we reformulate (13) as follows:
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y; P˜, B˜) =⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(by)PTpi
=
diag(b˜y)P˜
Tpi
1T diag(b˜y)P˜Tpi
=⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi =
1T diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(b˜y)P˜Tpi
diag(b˜y)P˜
Tpi, (44)
which holds for all pi ∈ ∆ and y = 1, . . . , Y .
Next, we consider (44) for a fixed y, and note that the
matrices diag(by)PT and diag(b˜y)P˜T are non-singular (by
Assumptions 1 and 2). Lemma 2 then yields that
diag(by)P
T = α(y) diag(b˜y)P˜
T =⇒
P diag(by) = P˜α(y) diag(b˜y), (45)
where α(y) ∈ R is a scalar and which holds for y = 1, . . . , Y .
If we sum equations (45) over y, and use the fact that B is
a stochastic matrix,
Y∑
y=1
P diag(by) =
Y∑
y=1
P˜α(y) diag(b˜y), =⇒
P = P˜
Y∑
y=1
α(y) diag(b˜y), (46)
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and then right-multiply by 1, and use that P is a stochastic
matrix, we obtain
P1 = P˜
Y∑
y=1
α(y) diag(b˜y)1, =⇒
1 = P˜
Y∑
y=1
α(y)b˜y. (47)
Pre-multiplying by P˜−1 yields
P˜−11 = P˜−1P˜
Y∑
y=1
α(y)b˜y =⇒
1 =
Y∑
y=1
α(y)b˜y, (48)
where we have used the fact that the row-sums of the inverse
of a (row) stochastic matrix are all equal to one6. By applying
the diag()-operation to (48), we see that
I =
Y∑
y=1
α(y) diag(b˜y), (49)
which when introduced in (46) yields that
P˜ = P. (50)
Next, note that (48) can be rewritten as 1 =
B˜
[
α(1) . . . α(Y )
]T
. We know that B˜1 = 1, since it
is a stochastic matrix, and that B˜ has full column rank by
assumption. Hence, 1 =
[
α(1) . . . α(Y )
]T
. This yields
by = b˜y, (51)
for y = 1, . . . , Y , from (45) by first pre-multiplying by P−1.
The other direction is trivial: if P = P˜ and B = B˜, then
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y; P˜, B˜) for all pi ∈ ∆ and each y =
1, . . . , Y by (9):
diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(by)PTpi
=
diag(b˜y)P˜
Tpi
1T diag(b˜y)P˜Tpi
. (52)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We begin by giving a generalization of Lemma 2:
Lemma 3. Let A ∈ RX×X and M ∈ RX×X be two non-
singular matrices and Z = {z1, . . . , zX , zX+1} be a set of
vectors where z1, . . . , zX ∈ RX are linearly independent and
the last vector when expressed in this basis has non-zero
components – that is, zX+1 ∈ RX can be written
zX+1 = [β]1z1 + · · ·+ [β]XzX , (53)
with β ∈ RX and [β]i 6= 0 for i = 1, . . . , X . If
Ax = κ(x)Mx, ∀x ∈ Z, (54)
where κ(x) is a non-zero scalar, then
A = κM, (55)
6To see this, consider an invertible stochastic matrix A: A1 = 1 =⇒
A−1A1 = A−11 =⇒ A−11 = 1.
where κ is a non-zero constant scalar.
Proof. For the ith vector in Z , we have by (54) that
Azi = κ(zi)Mzi, (56)
which can be concatenated to
A
[
z1 . . . zX
]
= M
[
κ(z1)z1 . . . κ(zX)zX
]
=⇒
AZ = M
[
z1 . . . zX
] κ(z1) 0. . .
0 κ(zX)

= MZ
κ(z1) 0. . .
0 κ(zX)
 , (57)
where we have denoted Z =
[
z1 . . . zX
]
.
We can rewrite (53) with this definition of Z as
zX+1 = Zβ, (58)
which together with (57) yields
AzX+1 = AZβ
= MZ
κ(z1) 0. . .
0 κ(zX)
β. (59)
Next, by employing (54) for zX+1 and using (58), we obtain
AzX+1 = κ(zX+1)MzX+1
= κ(zX+1)MZβ. (60)
Equating (59) and (60) yields
MZ
κ(z1) 0. . .
0 κ(zX)
β = κ(zX+1)MZβ =⇒
κ(z1) 0. . .
0 κ(zX)
β = κ(zX+1)β, (61)
by multiplying by the inverse of MZ from the left. The ith
component of (61) is
κ(zi)[β]i = κ(zX+1)[β]i =⇒
κ(zi) = κ(zX+1), (62)
since [β]i 6= 0. Hence,
κ(z1) = · · · = κ(zX) = κ(zX+1) def.= κ, (63)
which when introduced in (57) yields
AZ = MZ
κ 0. . .
0 κ

= κMZ, (64)
or, finally, A = κM by multiplying with the inverse of Z from
the right.
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Remark 6. Note that Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 3 by
considering the vectors e1, . . . , eX ∈ ∆ and any vector in the
interior of the simplex.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, to employ Lemma 3, we first
reformulate (13) as follows:
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y; P˜, B˜) =⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(by)PTpi
=
diag(b˜y)P˜
Tpi
1T diag(b˜y)P˜Tpi
=⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi =
1T diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(b˜y)P˜Tpi
diag(b˜y)P˜
Tpi, (65)
which holds for y = 1, . . . , Y and pi ∈ ∆y .
For a fixed y, the conditions of Lemma 3 are fulfilled; iden-
tify ∆y with the set Z and note that the matrices diag(b˜y)P˜T
and diag(b˜y)P˜T are non-singular. Hence,
diag(by)P
T = α(y) diag(b˜y)P˜
T , (66)
or, by taking the transpose,
P diag(by) = P˜α(y) diag(b˜y), (67)
for y = 1, . . . , Y . The setup is now exactly the same as after
(45) in the proof of Theorem 1 – the rest of the proof is
identical.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Multiply expression (9) for the HMM filter by its denomi-
nator to obtain (15), and then reshuffle the terms:
1T diag(byk)P
Tpik−1pik = diag(byk)P
Tpik−1 ⇐⇒
pik1
T diag(byk)P
Tpik−1 = diag(byk)P
Tpik−1 ⇐⇒(
pik1
T − I) diag(byk)PTpik−1 = 0. (68)
By vectorizing and applying a well-known result relating the
vectorization operator to Kronecker products [37], with an
appropriate grouping of the terms, we obtain that
vec(
[
pik1
T − I] (diag(byk)PT )pik−1) = 0 ⇐⇒(
piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]
)
vec(diag(byk)P
T ) = 0. (69)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
By definition, we have that
L
def.
=
Y∑
y=1
V Ty
=
Y∑
y=1
(αy diag(by)P
T )T
= P
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by). (70)
First, note that L is invertible since P is invertible (by
Assumption 2) and the result of the summation is a diagonal
matrix with strictly positive entries (by Assumption 1). Next,
we evaluate Ldiag(L−11) by introducing (70):
Ldiag(L−11)
= P
(
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by)
)
diag((P
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by))
−11)
= P
(
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by)
)
diag((
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by))
−1P−11)
= P
(
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by)
)
diag((
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by))
−11)
= P
(
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by)
)(
Y∑
y=1
αy diag(by)
)−1
= P, (71)
where in the third equality we used the fact that the inverse
of a row-stochastic matrix has elements on each row that sum
to one7, and in the fourth that the result of the summation
is a diagonal matrix and that it has a diagonal inverse that
is obtained by inverting each element. This allows us to
reconstruct the transition matrix P .
To reconstruct the observation matrix, we proceed as fol-
lows. First note that by multiplying Vy by P−T1 from the
right, we obtain
VyP
−T1 = αy diag(by)PT (P−T1)
= αyby, (72)
which is column y of the observation matrix scaled by a factor
αy . By horizontally stacking such vectors, we build the matrix
B¯
def.
=
[
V1P
−T1 . . . VY P−T1
]
=
[
α1b1 · · · αY bY
]
=
[
b1 · · · bY
]
diag([α1 . . . αY ]
T )
= B diag([α1 . . . αY ]
T ), (73)
which is the observation matrix B with scaled columns.
From (73), it is clear that each column of B¯ is colinear with
each corresponding column of B. Hence, we seek a diagonal
matrix that properly normalizes B¯:
B = B¯ diag(d), (74)
where d ∈ RY is the vector of how much each column
should be scaled. By multiplying (74) from the right by 1
and employing the sum-to-one property of B, we obtain that
the following should hold
B1 = B¯ diag(d)1 =⇒
1 = B¯d. (75)
Note that a solution to this equation exists by (73) and that the
αy:s are non-zero – each element of d is simply the inverse
of each αy . Now, since B is full column rank and the αy:s
7Assume A is invertible and row-stochastic: A1 = 1 =⇒ A−1A1 =
A−11 =⇒ 1 = A−11.
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are non-zero, relation (73) implies that B¯ is also full column
rank. Hence, the unique vector of normalization factors d is
d = B¯†1. (76)
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Recall the following rank-result for Kronecker products
[37]:
rank(A⊗B) = rank(A) rank(B), (77)
which implies that
rank(piTk−1 ⊗ [pik1T − I]) = 1× rank(pik1T − I). (78)
The last factor rank(pik1T − I) is equal to X − 1, since it is
a rank-1 perturbation to the identity matrix.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF REMARK 5
To see that a unique observation can be reconstructed
at each time k, suppose that pik = T (pik−1, yk;P,B) =
T (pik−1, y˜k;P,B) and observe that:
T (pi, y;P,B) = T (pi, y˜;P,B) =⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi
1T diag(by)PTpi
=
diag(by˜)P
Tpi
1T diag(by˜)PTpi
=⇒
diag(by)P
Tpi = α diag(by˜)P
Tpi, (79)
where pi ∈ ∆ is a posterior and α ∈ R>0 a positive scalar.
Continuing, we have that equation (79) implies
(diag(by)− α diag(by˜))PTpi = 0 =⇒
diag(by − αby˜)PTpi = 0 =⇒
[by − αby˜]i
[
PTpi
]
i
= 0, (80)
for i = 1, . . . , X . Under Assumption 1, we have that[
PTpi
]
i
> 0, so that we must have [by − αby˜]i = 0, for
i = 1, . . . , X . Or, equivalently,
by = αby˜. (81)
This yields, under Assumption 2, that α = 1 and y = y˜.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In essence, [34, Theorem 1] amounts to writing down the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for (29) and considering the
posterior as an unknown variable. It follows directly from this
result that the adversary could have held a belief pik when
making the decision uk if and only if
pik ∈
{
pi ∈ ∆ :
X∑
i=1
[pi]i∇uc(i, uk) = 0
}
. (82)
The set in (82) can be rewritten on matrix-vector form aspi ∈ R
X
≥0 :
[∇uc(1, uk) . . . ∇uc(X,uk)
1 . . . 1
]
pi =

0
...
0
1

 ,
(83)
which is non-empty by the fact that the adversary made a
decision. Since, by Assumption 4, the matrix
F (uk) =
[∇uc(1, uk) . . . ∇uc(X,uk)
1 . . . 1
]
(84)
has full column rank, the set (82) – or, equivalently (83) – is
singleton and the sole posterior in it is
pik = F (uk)
†

0
...
0
1
 , (85)
where † denotes pseudo-inverse.
